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The ‘Advance Interference-Like Effect’ of
Climate Targets: Fundamental Rights,
Intergenerational Equity and the German
Federal Constitutional Court
Petra Minnerop*
A B S T R A C T
Some climate lawsuits qualify as landmark cases, because they either mark an unexpected
turning point in environmental jurisprudence, or they introduce a new conceptual analysis
of the law vis-à-vis the global challenge of climate change. The decision of the German
Federal Constitutional Court from March 2021 meets both criteria, it has already defined
climate policy and law-making in Germany, and it revolutionised the traditional concept
of ‘interference’ with fundamental rights under the German Basic Law. This article exam-
ines the order and its significance for climate litigation, legislation and constitutional doc-
trine, and it analyses how international law defines the state’s objective to protect the cli-
mate pursuant to Article 20a Basic Law, including for future generations. On that basis,
the article argues that the Court’s approach towards intergenerational equity remains lim-
ited due to the perception of the carbon budget as ‘freedom budget’.
K E Y W O R D S : Climate Litigation, Fundamental Rights, Climate Protection Act,
Federal Constitutional Court, Intergenerational Equity
1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N
In a decision published on 29 April 2021, the First Senate of the German Federal
Constitutional Court held that the four constitutional complaints against the Federal
Climate Change Act of 12 December 2019 (CCA) concerning the national climate tar-
gets and the annual emission amounts allowed until 2030 were partially successful.1
* Petra Minnerop, Associate Professor of International Law, Durham Law School, Durham University, UK.
(petra.minnerop@durham.ac.uk)
1 Order of the First Senate of the Court (Beschluss des Ersten Senats), 24 March 2021, 1 BvR 2656/
18—paras 1–270, published on 29 April 2021. The full German version is available at <www.bundesver
fassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2021/03/rs20210324_1bvr265618.html>
accessed 22 November 2021; a shorter English version is available at <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.
de/e/rs20210324_1bvr265618en.html> accessed 22 November 2021 (hereinafter BVerfG); references
are made to the English translation. Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court are available here
<www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/DE/Entscheidungen/Entscheidungen/Amtliche%20Sammlung%
20BVerfGE.html> accessed 22 November 2021.
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This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited.
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Some climate lawsuits qualify as landmark cases, they either mark an unexpected turning
point in environmental jurisprudence coupled with a significant and lasting impact, or
they introduce a new conceptual analysis of the law vis-à-vis the global challenge of cli-
mate change. A prime example of an impactful case is the decision of Massachussetts v
EPA, and Richard Lazarus devoted an entire book to the discussion of the case and its
legal implications.2
The decision of the Constitutional Court has already defined climate policy and
law-making in Germany, and it introduced a new conceptual approach to the trad-
itional understanding of the meaning of ‘interference’ in constitutional doctrine. It is
arguably a momentous climate case; it marks a significant development for German
constitutional law, the reception of international law at constitutional level and for
the country’s climate legislation. The interpretation of the Constitution through the
Federal Constitutional Court is axiomatic for the country’s entire legal order.3 The
German Constitutional Court has grasped the opportunity that the constitutional
complaints presented to it, to create the doctrine of ‘advance interference-like effect’
and to apply the strict yardsticks that a constitutional justification of an interference
with fundamental rights demands. In addition, the Court has interpreted the state’s
constitutional objective on climate protection in the light of the Paris Agreement’s
temperature target and the remaining national carbon budget.
This article examines the order within the context of German constitutional law
and the complex relevant legal doctrines that the Court used and expanded, and on
that basis, analyses the interlinkages between the state’s objective to protect the cli-
mate pursuant to Article 20a Basic Law (’Grundgesetz’)4 and international law on cli-
mate change, and how the state’s constitutional obligation to promote climate
protection unfolds a concrete mandate for the state’s international efforts.
One aspect of constitutional doctrine is important to note at the outset, it relates to
the systematic approach of fundamental rights protection under the Basic Law. At the
core of the case lies the differentiation between the two primary dimensions of funda-
mental rights that shape the relationship between the individual and the state. These
dimensions concern the subjective and the objective functions of fundamental rights that
form part of the doctrinal approach under the Basic Law.5 The subjective function relates
to the duty of the state to abstain from interferences with these rights (obligation to ab-
stain, negative function, ‘Abwehrfunktion’).6 The objective function dictates that the state
2 Richard J Lazarus, The Rule of Five (Harvard University Press 2020).
3 See further Gunnar F Schuppert and Christian Bumke, Die Konstitutionalisierung der Rechtsordnung
(Nomos 2000); Christian Bumke, Andreas Vosskuhle and Andrew Hammel, German Constitutional Law:
Introduction, Cases and Principles (OUP 2019) 26.
4 In German: Staatszielbestimmung, ‘objective of the state’.
5 These are rooted in the system that was proposed by Georg Jellinek as the different forms of ‘status’ that
define the relationship between the individual and the democratic state. The ‘negative status’ ensures free-
dom from the state in the sense of interferences that originate from the state. The ‘positive status’ means
freedom through the state which can include participation in political processes and the provision of wel-
fare means. It requires that the state adopts protective measures. Georg Jellinek, System der subjektiven
öffentlichen Rechte (2nd edn, Mohr Siebeck 1905) 85.
6 BVerfGE 115, 320, 358. The duty of the state to protect the freedom of the individual from interferences of
state power; Hans Dieter Jarass, Vorb. vor art 1 para 3 in Hans Jarass and Martin Kment (eds), Jarass/Pieroth,
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Kommentar (16th edn, Beck 2020) (hereinafter Jarass).
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protects fundamental rights (obligation to act, positive function or protective duty,
‘Schutzpflicht’).7 Formative for this protective duty is the understanding that fundamen-
tal rights constitute not only individual rights against interferences but rather represent
an objective value order in which the protective duty of the state is rooted.8 This latter
paradigm grants the state a wide margin of appreciation in choosing suitable concepts
and measures in protecting individual rights and, correspondingly, the judicial review is
limited in its scope.9
The Constitutional Court will regularly determine that a violation of the duty to pro-
tect has occurred in situations where protective measures are entirely missing, if they
are evidently unsuitable or completely insufficient for achieving the desired objectives,
or when they fall considerably short of the protective target.10 Conversely, a much
tighter standard of judicial review is applicable if fundamental rights are concerned in
their subjective function, in cases where an interference with a protected right is at
stake. Therefore, in introducing the notion of ‘advance interference-like effect’,11 the
Court re-imagined the doctrine of interference under the state’s obligation to abstain, in
the specific context of climate change, and thereby opened constitutional doctrine for
an innovative approach towards protecting the future enjoyment of fundamental rights.
This turn in the decision pertains to more than just nuances of the review threshold. It
rather constitutes creative judicial reasoning that took calculations of a remaining na-
tional carbon budget into account and permitted the Court to examine the emission re-
duction targets until 2030 against the strict constitutional yardsticks that judicial review
reserves for the state’s undue interference with fundamental rights.
Furthermore, the advance effect of the current legislation and the emphasis on
the intertemporal dimension of fundamental rights stress the significant function of
a legal determination of emission amounts in directing transformational changes
while protecting—to some degree—future generations. A theory of intergenera-
tional equity is devised for a comprehensive analysis of the order’s ramifications for
future generations, starting with the theoretical framework that was first introduced
by Edith Brown Weiss. On that basis, it is argued that while the Court has indirect-
ly achieved some protection of future generations, its forbearance to fundamentally
challenge the mean temperature target of 1.75C for calculating the overall size of
the national carbon budget and its focus on protecting emission-intensive freedom
rights, does neither satisfy the mandate under Article 20a Basic Law nor can it re-
flect the full dimension of intergenerational and intragenerational equity.
Therefore, the article offers an alternative reading that aligns the state’s mandate to
protect the natural foundations of life with an international principle of intergen-
erational equity.
7 BVerfGE 117, 202, 227; Jarass (n 6) Vorb. vor art 1 para 8.
8 BVerfGE 125, 39, 78.
9 This is established case law of the Court, see BVerfGE 96, 56, 64; BVerfGE 125, 39, 78; even though it
leads to an asymmetrical relation between the state’s duty to actively protect rights and its duty to abstain
from an interference with rights, see for a further discussion Christoph Möllers und Nils Weinberg, ‘Die
Klimaschutzentscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’ (2021) 76 Juristen Zeitung 1069, 1072.
10 BVerfGE 142, 313, 337; BVerfGE (n 1) para 152.
11 In German: Eingriffsähnliche Vorwirkung, BVerfG (n 1) para 183.






/jel/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jel/eqab041/6486888 by guest on 05 January 2022
2 . C L I M A T E L E G I S L A T I O N I N G E R M A N Y
The Federal Climate Change Act (CCA) in its original version was enacted in
December 2019 and represented the country’s first comprehensive climate statute.12
Prior to its amendment (this will be explained below) and at the time when the con-
stitutional complaints were decided, it set as a target to reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions by at least 55% by 2030 relative to 1990 levels.13 The objective of
the CCA explicitly incorporates the temperature target of the Paris Agreement of
‘holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2C above pre-
industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5C above
pre-industrial levels’,14 and it prescribes the long-term goal of pursuing climate neu-
trality by 2050.15
The CCA thereby responds to the requirement of greater climate action and the
pertinent policy objectives of the German Federal Government. It aims ‘to provide
protection from the effects of worldwide climate change by ensuring achievement of
the national climate targets and compliance with the European targets’.16 Before
December 2019, the national climate targets had only been determined in a cabinet
decision, without any legally binding effect towards the individual as stated by the
Berlin Administrative Court in the first climate case against the Government.17
In order to achieve the interim target of at least 55% emission reductions relative
to 1990 levels by 2030, section 3(1) CCA specified that GHG emissions must be
gradually reduced across all sectors. The CCA prescribes concrete annual emission
amounts for each sector and it determines that setting an overall reduction target as
well as sector-specific targets in combination with a periodical review of the reached
emission reductions, are measures without alternative to ensure a consistent and effi-
cient course of action.19
According to the complainants, the provisions in the CCA that defined the con-
crete sectoral targets were nevertheless insufficient to ensure the required protection
of fundamental rights. Moreover, the approach of setting concrete targets in the
CCA itself was only followed until 2030, for the years after that the original version
of the CCA authorised the German Government to update emission reductions
12 Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz of 12 December 2019 (CCA), the new version includes the amendment(s) to
the Act by Article 1 of the Act of 18 August 2021 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 3905) <https://www.gese-
tze-im-internet.de/englisch_ksg/index.html> accessed 15 December 2021.
13 CCA, ibid s 3(1).
14 The Paris Agreement, opened for signature 16 February 2016, UNTS I-54113 (entered into force 4
November 2016) art 2(1)(a).
15 CCA (n 12) s 1.
16 ibid, s 1 first sentence. It should be noted that the CCA does not include any provision on adaptation.
17 German Farmers v Germany, Berlin Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht Berlin) VG 10 K 412.18.
The judgment was delivered on 31 October 2019 and is only available in German. For a discussion of
the case see Petra Minnerop, ‘The First German Climate Case’ (2020) 22 Environmental Law Review
215–26.
18 Paris Agreement (n 14) art 2(1)(a).
19 CCA (n 12) ss 3(1) and 4(1) third sentence CCA in conjunction with Annex 2; CCA under C
(‘Alternativen’): ‘Keine. Um die Klima-und Energieziele der Bundesregierung zu erreichen, ist eine sektorüber-
greifende Regelung erforderlich, die sowohl die Zielerreichungspfade für die einzelnen Sektoren als auch eine
zeitnahe Erfassung des jeweils erreichten Standes der Minderung umfasst. Nur so ist ein konsistentes und damit
effizientes Vorgehen zur Erreichung der vorgegebenen Ziele gewährleistet.’
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targets by means of an ordinance (’Rechtsverordnung’), albeit with consent of the
Bundestag.20 The CCA did not provide criteria for these further reductions, or a
regular timeframe for re-visiting the required interim targets. It only prescribed that
once, in 2025, the Federal Government had to set annually decreasing emission
amounts for further periods.21
For the political background of the case, it is important to note that general elec-
tions took place in Germany in September 2021 and climate protection was among
the key themes of the election campaigns.22 Not surprisingly, the Government
announced new targets after the release of the Court’s order, the so-called ’Contract
for Generations’ (’Generationenvertrag’) as an amendment to the CCA on 12 May
2021.23 The amendment was adopted by the Bundestag on 24 June 2021, passed by
the second Chamber of the Federal Parliament, the Bundesrat, on 25 June 2021, and
entered into force on 31 August 2021.24 It replaces the previous objective of achiev-
ing net-GHG neutrality with an earlier target year of 2045, it increases the 2030 tar-
get to 65% GHG emission reductions compared to 1990 levels, it defines a target of
88% reductions of GHG emissions by 2040, and it reduces annual emissions allowan-
ces for individual sectors.25 After 2050, negative GHG emissions are to be achieved,
according to section 3(2) second sentence CCA.
The CCA explicitly concretises the Paris Agreement’s ratchet mechanism. If
higher national climate targets are required for compliance with European or inter-
national climate targets, the Federal Government is under the obligation to initiate
the necessary steps for increasing the ’target values’, and climate targets may be
raised but not lowered.26 The first annual review of March 2021, required by the
CCA, indicated that the country achieved its climate targets for 2020.27 In 2020,
GHG emissions were 40.8% lower than in 1990 and 8.7% lower compared to
2019.28 Five of the six sectors met their individual reduction objectives, with the sec-
tor ’buildings’ remaining below target. As a result of reducing the amount of electri-
city generated using coal, the energy sector yielded the most significant reductions of
approximately 33 Mio. tonnes of CO2.
29
20 CCA (n 12) s 4(5).
21 ibid, s 4(6).
22 The election took place on 26 September 2021, see order of 8 December 2020 (Anordnung über die
Bundestagswahl 2021 vom 8. December 2020), BGBl I 2020, 2769; see also <www.bundestagswahl-
2021.de/datum> accessed 22 November 2021.
23 The starting point—targets of the German Federal Government (’Die Ausgangslage—und die Ziele der
Bunderegierung’) <www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/klimaschutz/bundesregierung-klimapoli
tik-1637146> accessed 22 November 2021.
24 Generationenvertrag für das Klima <www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/klimaschutz/klimaschutz
gesetz-2021-1913672> accessed 19 November 2021; see further <https://www.bundestag.de/doku-
mente/textarchiv/2021/kw25-de-klimaschutzgesetz-846922> accessed 11 December 2021.
25 The new climate targets, ibid. Greenhouse gases under the CCA include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3) as well as the
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs) listed in Annex V, Pt 2 of the European
Governance Regulation, see s 2(1).
26 CCA (n 12) s 3(4).
27 For the data, see <www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/buerokratieabbau/klimaschutzziel-2020-
erreicht-1876954> accessed 19 November 2021.
28 ibid.
29 ibid.
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3 . T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N A L C O M P L A I N T
The complainants asserted that the CCA from 2019, with its reduction targets up to
2030 and the lack of concrete interim targets beyond 2030, violated several funda-
mental rights. They primarily claimed that the state, in enacting sections 3(1) and
4(1) third sentence CCA in conjunction with Annex 2, had failed to introduce a legal
framework that ensured a sufficient and timely reduction of greenhouse gases, espe-
cially carbon dioxide (CO2), to limit the increase in the Earth’s temperature to
1.5C, or at least to well below 2C. The complainants—some of whom live in
Bangladesh and Nepal—relied primarily on the alleged omission of the state to
adopt suitable measures that comply with the objective function of the fundamental
rights (the duty to protect) under Article 2(2) first sentence and Article 14(1) Basic
Law. They argued that the emission thresholds of the CCA were too high to meet
the temperature target of 1.5C and that exceeding this temperature would increas-
ingly endanger lives and livelihoods as well as risking that crucial ecological tipping
points with unpredictable consequences for the climate system were reached. They
based their claim on the required reductions of CO2 emissions in line with the so-
called ’carbon budget’ approach of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC).30 In addition, they argued that their fundamental right to a future consistent
with human dignity and a right to an ‘ecological minimum standard of living’ (’ökolo-
gisches Existenzminimum’) was violated.31 They derived this right from Article 2(1)
in conjunction with Article 20a and Article 1(1) first sentence Basic Law.
With regard to future burdens arising from the obligation to drastically reduce
emissions for periods after 2031—which was described as a potential ‘full break’—
the complainants relied on the omission of the legislator to define targets in the
CCA beyond 2030, thereby violating the rule of materiality reservation
(’Wesentlichkeitsvorbehalt’) that demaned a determination of future targets in a
statutory provision.
Finally, the two environmental associations asserted that as ‘advocates of nature’,
they could bring a claim on the basis of Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article
19(3) and Article 20a Basic Law, in the light of Article 47 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights. They argued that the legislator had failed to take suitable meas-
ures to limit climate change and thereby disregarded binding requirements under EU
law to protect the natural foundations of life.
3.1 Admissibility of the Case
The Court held that the complainants had, in so for as they were presenting the
claims in their capacity as natural persons, legal standing. The requirement of legal
30 IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policymakers in Valerie Masson-Delmotte and others (eds), Global Warming
of 1.5C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5C above pre-industrial levels and
related global greenhouse gas emission pathways’, at 18, D 1.1. <www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/
2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf> accessed 22 November 2021.
31 See already Hans H Rupp, ‘Die verfassungserchtliche Seite des Umweltschutzes’ (1971) 26 Juristen
Zeitung 401, 404; for the historical dimension of this discussion see Ines Härtel,
‘Klimaschutzverfassungsrecht: Klima-Staatszielbestimmungen im Föderalismus’ (2020) 42 Natur und
Recht 577, 579.
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standing demands that a violation of a fundamental right is at least possible.32
Furthermore, complainants must be concerned in their own rights (’selbst’), they
must be directly (’unmittelbar’) and presently (’gegenwärtig’) affected, which
includes already existing but also imminent (’bevorstehende’) violations.33 Firstly,
the Court explained that the legal duty to protect fundamental rights
(’Schutzpflichten’) under Articles 2(1) and 14(1) Basic Law could be violated be-
cause the CCA until 2030 allowed the country to produce a too generous amount of
GHG emissions until that point in time.34 Secondly, the possibly very deep emission
reductions required after 2030 could constitute an unconstitutional future threat for
the enjoyment of fundamental rights. Accordingly, at this point, the Court did not
exclude that the possibility of a rights violation existed under any of the two dimen-
sions of fundamental rights (the duty to protect and the duty to abstain from inter-
ferences) discussed above, and it found that a violation of fundamental rights of the
complainants living in Bangladesh and in Nepal was possible. The Court held that
thus far, it had never clarified if fundamental rights protected under the Basic Law
obliged the German State to protect people living abroad, from negative consequen-
ces caused by climate change, and under which circumstances such a duty to protect
could be violated.35
In relation to the admissibility criteria that fundamental rights had to be affected
at present, ie ‘currently’, the Court noted that the CCA’s targets could unfold an ‘ad-
vance interference-like effect’ for the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms in the fu-
ture.36 This advance interference-like effect already determined future limitations for
fundamental rights, not just factually but legally.37 The Court finally found that the
mere fact that a very large number of people were affected by this advance
interference-like effect, did not prevent it from concluding that individual fundamen-
tal rights of the complainants could possibly violated.38
The Court considered that after 2030, drastically deeper reductions at very short no-
tice could be required by Article 20a Basic Law which defines climate protection as one
of the general constitutional objectives of the state (’Staatszielbestimmung’).39 This
objective was introduced into the Basic Law in 1994 and while it does not provide a
subjective right, it is a constitutionally binding objective for the state and a justiciable
32 Act on the Federal Constitutional Court, Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (BVerfGG) art 93 I Nr 4a
<https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bverfgg/englisch_bverfgg.html> accessed 13 December
2021.
33 BVerfGE 77, 170, 220; Jarass (n 6) art 20a, paras 27–29.
34 BVerfG (n 1) paras 99–102.
35 ibid. para 117.
36 ibid, para 116; an in-depth investigation of this issue is reserved for the merits.
37 ibid, para 130.
38 ibid, para 110, the Court referred to the VG Berlin (n 17).
39 ibid, paras 117, 118. The provision reads: ‘Article 20a [Protection of the natural foundations of life and
animals] Mindful also of its responsibility towards future generations, the state shall protect the natural
foundations of life and animals by legislation and, in accordance with law and justice, by executive and ju-
dicial action, all within the framework of the constitutional order.’ <www.gesetze-im-internet.de/eng
lisch_gg/englisch_gg.html> accessed 22 November 2021. See further Martin Kment, Die Neujustierung
des Nachhaltigkeitsprinzips im Verwaltungsrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2019).
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norm that aims at the protection of the natural foundations of life, including for future
generations.40 The Court explained that complainants living in Bangladesh and Nepal
could not be affected in their own rights as far as these future climate protection meas-
ures in Germany would be concerned, because they would not be affected by con-
straints placed upon their freedom rights through deeper emission cuts.41 Furthermore,
the two environmental associations had no standing to make a constitutional complaint.
The Basic Law and constitutional procedural law make no provision that affords envir-
onmental associations legal standing in this situation.42
The admissibility of the constitutional complaint against the legal provisions of
the CCA did not require to exhaust other remedies.43 Furthermore, the fact that the
CCA implemented EU law in the sense of Article 51(1) first sentence of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union did not prevent the Court to assess
the provisions against the German Constitution and its yardsticks, in line with the
established case law of the Constitutional Court44 and the Court of Justice of the
European Union.45
3.2 The Merits of the Case
3.2.1 Defining the constitutional yardstick
The Court found that as a result of the dangers posed by climate change, duties to
protect arise from Article 2(2) first sentence and Article 14(1) Basic Law in relation
to the complainants who live in Germany, and that such duties could, in principle,
also apply vis-à-vis the complainants living in Bangladesh and Nepal, albeit with a dif-
ferent content than within Germany.46
The protection of life and physical integrity under Article 2(2) first sentence
Basic Law encompasses protection against impairments caused by environmental
pollution, regardless of the circumstances or the source of the impairment.47 This
clarifies for the first time in constitutional jurisprudence in Germany that the state’s
duty to protect under Article 2(2) first sentence Basic Law includes the duty to
40 Federal Administrative Court, Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht
98, 399; BT-Drs. 12/6000, 67. See also art 37 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf> accessed 13 December 2021; the Weimar
Constitution provided in its art 150 protection of the environment, it stated that ‘the landscapes enjoy
the protection and care of the state’; <https://www.gdw-berlin.de/fileadmin/bilder/publikationen/
Materialien_zur_Demokratiegeschichte/GDW_Weimarer_Reichsverfassung_2018web.pdf> accessed 13
December 2021; Jarass (n 6) art 20a, para 1.
41 BVerfG (n 1) para 132.
42 ibid, para 136; art 19(3) Basic Law prescribes that legal persons can be bearer of fundamental rights to
the extent that the nature of such rights permits (’im Wesen anwendbar’). This demands that the forma-
tion and activity of the legal person constitutes an extension of the use of fundamental rights through nat-
ural persons. See Bumke, Voßkuhle and Hammel (n 3) 38, para 21. However, the Basic Law makes no
provision for actio popularis claims.
43 BVerfG (n 1) para 138.
44 BVerfGE 152, 152, 168 para 39—Recht auf Vergessen I (Right to be forgotten I).
45 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Judgment of 26 February 2013—Åkerberg, C-617/10,
EU:C:2013:105, para 29.
46 BVerfG (n 1) para 174.
47 ibid, para 147.
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protect life and health against the risks posed by climate change.48 Furthermore, this
duty also encompasses protecting future generations from the adverse effects of our
changing climate.49 This specific obligation to protect future generations assumes an
objective-legal nature, since future generations ‘either as a whole or as a sum of indi-
viduals’ cannot hold rights at present.50
The protective duty comprises mitigation of and adaptation to climate change.
The state is under a constitutional obligation to mitigate the significant risks of
climate change through measures embedded in the international context, and
climate adaptation measures are necessary, including the protection against climate-
related extreme weather events such as heat waves, floods or hurricanes.51 Notably,
the Court acknowledged that climate change is taking place today and that further
climate change is no longer preventable.52 Therefore, adaptation measures are crucial
to limit the risks posed by the actual impacts to ‘levels that are tolerable under consti-
tutional law’.53
Since climate change can moreover result in damage being caused to property
such as agricultural land or real estate (eg due to rising sea levels or droughts), the
fundamental right to property under Article 14(1) Basic Law also imposes a (separ-
ate) duty of protection on the state. The Court referred to the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights to explain that the European Convention on
Human Rights demanded the fulfilment of a positive obligation to protect against
health hazards arising from environmental harm, albeit without stipulating a higher
standard of protection than under the Basic Law.54
The global character of climate change did not in diminish or otherwise interfere
with this standard of the protective duty of the state.55 In the contrary, the Court
employed the global nature of climate change to concretise the content of the duty
to protect fundamental rights. The global character of climate change obliged the
state to actively seek a solution at the international level.56 The duty to protect
demanded internationally orientated actions of the state for global climate protection
and that included working towards climate protection in international fora (including
negotiations, treaty frameworks and international organisations) in conjunction with
national measures that were suitable to contribute to halting climate change.57
48 ibid, para 143.
49 ibid, para 146.
50 ibid.
51 ibid, para 148.
52 ibid, para 150.
53 ibid.
54 ibid, para 147; Öneryildiz v Turkey, App no 48939/99 (ECtHR, 30 November 2004) para 89; Budayeva
and Others v Russia, App no 15339/02 (ECtHR, 20 March 2008) para 128; Silja Vöneky and Felix Beck
‘Vierzehnter Abschnitt. Schutz der antarktischen und arktischen Umwelt’ in Alexander Proelß (ed),
Internationales Umweltrecht (De Gruyter 2017) 133, 146.
55 BVerfG (n 1) para 178: ‘The fact that the German state cannot prevent climate change on its own but
can do so only in the context of international involvement would not, in principle, rule out a duty of pro-
tection arising from fundamental rights here . . .’.
56 BVerfG (n 1) para 179.
57 ibid, para 197.
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3.2.2 No violation of the duty to protect
After dedicating considerable effort to concretising the state’s duty to protect, the
Court held that its judicial capacity to assess the suitability of the measures taken in
the fulfilment of this duty was limited.58 This might be a surprising turn in the
Court’s reasoning, however, it relates to the differentiation between the two main
dimensions of fundamental rights as discussed at the beginning. It is established case
law of the Court that the duty to protect fundamental rights is generally indetermin-
ate and affords a wide margin of appreciation to the state.59 Accordingly, the legisla-
tor has discretion concerning the concept of protection and the concrete measures that
are adopted. The constitutionally required minimum standard is only violated if pro-
tective measures are completely missing, the measures are evidently unsuitable to
meet the aim of the duty to protect, or when the measures fall significantly below
the required standard of protection.60
Given the leeway of the legislator, no violation of the duty to protect was found in
the present case. However, it is noteworthy that the Court took the opportunity to ex-
plicate different scenarios that it would regard as insufficient. From a constitutional-law
point of view, this elaboration of scenarios was not necessary but it nevertheless served
to define a baseline for lawful action, almost in the form of guidance for the legislator.
For example, a violation could occur in a situation where the concept of climate pro-
tection would aim at the reduction of GHG emissions but without pursuing the object-
ive of climate neutrality.61 Any protection strategy that failed to pursue the goal of
climate neutrality would have to be qualified as manifestly unsuitable to protect against
the risks of climate change—as required by fundamental rights. Global warming would
then be impossible to stop, given that every increase in the concentration of CO2 in
the atmosphere contributes to global warming and, once CO2 is released into the at-
mosphere, it mostly stays there and is unlikely to be removable in the foreseeable fu-
ture. Another entirely inadequate approach would be to allow climate change to
simply run its course, and to rely exclusively on adaptation measures. Furthermore, if
the CCA would only include a reduction objective for 2030 without setting interim tar-
gets,62 it would not be suitable to guarantee a certain temperature threshold, given that
this would fail to determine how much GHG emissions could be emitted in the mean-
time.63 Therefore, the goal of net-zero GHG emissions demands that emissions are
continuously reduced, and until climate neutrality is achieved.64
58 ibid, para 152.
59 BVerfGE 79, 172, 202.
60 BVerfG (n 1) para 152, BVerfGE 142, 313, 337 para 70.
61 The provision in s 2 No 9 CCA (n 12) describes net greenhouse gas neutrality as ’an equilibrium between
the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases from sources and the reduction in the volume of such
gases by means of sinks.’
62 CCA (n 12), s 3(1) second sentence.
63 This concerns the differentiation between single-year and multi-year targets. Adopting multi-year targets
is important for achieving the Paris Agreement’s temperature target and, in particular, for the functioning
of the market instruments under art 6 Paris Agreement. If states only commit to single-year targets in
their nationally determined contributions, calculating the overall mitigation outcomes that are achieved is
challenging.
64 BVerfG (n 1) para 156 speaks of the ‘goal of neutrality’.
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The complainants had argued that the Paris Agreement would be insufficient to
fulfil the state’s duty to protect.65 They asserted that only the objective of limiting
warming to 1.5C would be suitable to fulfil the state’s duty.66 The Court acknowl-
edged that the more recently published scientific evidence, especially the 1.5C
IPCC Special Report, concluded that the climate-related risks for natural and human
systems would be lower in a 1.5C than in a 2C warming scenario.67 The Court
also acknowledged that the IPCC had intensified its warnings based on this new data
and risk analysis.68 However, while adopting a target of 2C and pursuing the object-
ive of 1.5C could be considered as being not ambitious enough from a political per-
spective, the Court did not find that the legislator exceeded the considerable
discretion it had from a legal point of view, in adopting measures that were based on
calculating the national carbon budget in line with the arithmetical mean of 1.75C
of the target-range of the Paris Agreement.
The Court recognised that achieving 2C with the current emission amounts in
the CCA seemed more likely, and that there were signs that the 55% reduction tar-
get for 2030 had been modelled already in 2010 and in accordance with a 2C tem-
perature target, which would not be compatible with the constitutional obligation
to take climate action.69 Even for achieving a 1.75C target with a likelihood of
67%, the German Advisory Council on the Environment (Advisory Council,
’Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen’) had calculated a concrete national rest-
budget of 6.7 gigatonnes of CO2 starting from 2020 until achieving climate neutral-
ity,70 which would require deeper emission cuts post-2030. This calculation was
based upon a per-capita-right to emissions world-wide, in other words, a pro-rata
distribution of the remaining global carbon budget pursuant to the actual popula-
tion.71 Using a mean value of the Paris Agreement’s temperature range as tempera-
ture target, albeit not being politically the most ambitious one,72 was according to
the Court still within the margin of discretion of the state. However, an important
aspect in this context was the fact that adaptation measures in Germany could be
adopted to ensure the protection of the right to health, as this would make it pos-
sible to meet the pertinent constitutional standard of protection.73 However, it was
clear at this point, and this will be discussed further below, that the current calcula-
tions were not suitable for realising the mandate to pursue efforts of limiting the
temperature increase to 1.5C.74
65 BVerfG (n 1) para 158.
66 ibid, para 159.
67 ibid, paras 160, 161.
68 ibid.
69 ibid, para 166: ’The history behind the reduction quota set down in § 3(1) second sentence KSG indi-
cates that it was originally linked to a 2C target.’.
70 ibid, para 219.
71 ibid, para 225.
72 ibid, para 162: ‘If the legislator has nonetheless based the national climate change legislation on the com-
mitment undertaken by the Parties to the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to well below 2C
and preferably to 1.5C, this may be regarded as politically too unambitious’.
73 BVerfG (n 1) para 167.
74 ibid, para 235, acknowledging that this was not a ‘particularly stringent approach’.
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3.2.3 The ‘advance interference-like effect’ of climate targets
After explaining that the legislator’s measures had not violated the duty to protect,
the Court turned to the effect of the legally determined amounts of sectoral emis-
sions in the CCA and, crucially, their already foreseeable effects of requiring deeper
reductions in the future. As mentioned earlier, the Court devised the new doctrine of
‘advance interference-like effect’ in order to link the current legislative decision on
the emission allowances per sector with emission reductions that would be necessary
post-2030.
In the light of emission reductions that would be required after 2030 to meet the
2050 target of net-zero emissions, the CCA’s interim targets unfolded an effect, not
just de facto but also de jure, that was comparable to an interference with fundamental
rights that protect the various forms of daily activities. These activities are, and for
the foreseeable future continue to be, predominantly still linked with producing CO2
emissions. These activities are protected in specific fundamental rights provisions,
and in addition, the Basic Law guarantees in Article 2(1) the general right to freedom
of action (‘Allgemeines Freiheitsrecht’).75 A generous approach to reducing CO2
emissions before 2030 would demand more drastic reductions post-2030, since the
legislator was required to halt climate change under constitutional law (through the
duty to protect fundamental rights and under Article 20a). The state would be
required to achieve carbon neutrality soon after 2030 and it was not likely that this
could be achieved.76 Under current emission trends and as foreseeable in accordance
with the CCA’s targets, the CO2 rest-budget after 2030 would be less than 1 giga-
tonnne CO2 in accordance with the calculations of the Advisory Council.
77 In the
light of the expected amount of emissions for 2031, the rest budget at that point
would barely be ‘enough’ for a further year.78 Granting a freedom today will there-
fore limit future opportunities to exercise such CO2 related freedom rights under
constitutional law.
In addition, the Court stressed that particularly a fast consumption of the remain-
ing CO2 budget until 2030 increased the risk of grave limitations to be placed on
fundamental freedoms, because it would reduce the available time for technological
and social developments that could enable a transition towards a climate neutral way
of life.79
Consequently, the challenged provisions of the CCA fell into the (now extended)
category of ‘interference’ with fundamental rights. An interference with rights can,
however, only be justified under strict constitutional standards.80 The concrete cause
for this risk of future interferences were the provisions that established the allowed
CO2 emissions in accordance with section 3(1) second sentence and section 4(1)
third sentence CCA in conjunction with Annex 2. These provisions decided irrevers-
ibly how much of the CO2 budget could be emitted after 2030 and they defined the
75 BVerfGE 67, 157, 171; Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Suhrkamp 1985) 309; Jarass (n 6) art 2,
paras 1–5.
76 BVerfG (n 1) para 234.
77 ibid, para 233.
78 ibid, para 246.
79 ibid, para 248.
80 ibid, paras 184-187.
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time that was available for those transformations that are necessary. While the legisla-
tor was hardly able to define the concrete developments of climate-neutral alterna-
tives and innovations in detail, it was a constitutional obligation to create the
underlying conditions and incentives so that these developments can take place.81
To trigger the transitional changes, the CCA itself must either define the size of the
annual emission amounts, or it must set out further criteria for the definition of these
amounts through the Federal Government.82 For example, the CCA could define the
emission reduction amounts for certain target years.83 These determinations are so ma-
terial for the protection of fundamental rights, that they fall into the category of deci-
sions that the legislator must adopt in form of a statutory provision (materiality
reservation or ‘Wesentlichkeitsvorbehalt’), they cannot be delegated to the Executive
in accordance with Article 80(1) Basic Law,84 the mere fact that the German
Bundestag must give its consent to an ordinance of the Government cannot replace
the democratic function of parliamentary debate which is precisely the reason for the
requirement to set the emission reductions in law.85
The Court did not declare the provisions as being void, even though this would be
the expected outcome in cases where the constitutional complaint is successful in ac-
cordance with section 95(3) first sentence BVerfGG. However, if the voidance of a
provision leads to a situation that sets it even further apart from the constitutional
standard, the Court can simply declare that provision as being irreconcilable with the
Constitution and order its temporary application, coupled with the mandate to rectify
the identified flaws. The legislator was granted a period until 31 December 2022 to de-
termine the emission reduction targets post-2030 in line with the reasoning of the
Court.86
4 . O P E N N E S S O F T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N T O I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W
O N C L I M A T E C H A N G E
Legal orders, constitutional doctrine and legal imagination are continuously chal-
lenged by climate change and the rapidly evolving and firming climate science. The
Federal Constitutional Court has grasped the opportunity that the constitutional
complaints presented to it, to create the novel doctrine of the advance interference-
like effect and cohere it with the stricter requirements that constitutional law estab-
lishes for any restriction placed upon fundamental rights. In addition, the Court
made some impactful statements on the role of fundamental rights in their objective
dimension (the basis for the duty to protect) and the state’s obligation of climate
protection under Article 20a Basic Law.
81 ibid paras 187, 194 and 248: ’...the state itself has neither the capacity nor the sole responsibility for pro-
viding all the technological and social developments to replace and avoid greenhouse gas-intensive proc-
esses and products, and for setting up the necessary infrastructure.’.
82 ibid, para 261.
83 ibid, para 264, please note that this is a reference to the German decision, not the entire order was trans-
lated into English.
84 That provision allows the legislator to authorise the Federal Government, the Federal Minister or the
Land Governments to issue statutory instruments.
85 ibid, para 265.
86 ibid, para 268 (omitted from the English translation). The legislator amended the CCA on 24 June 2021,
see (n 24) .
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The decision undoubtedly tests conventional constitutional boundaries, it trans-
lates the IPCC’s emission pathways into a national carbon budget approach that is
judicially reviewable, and it applies the ‘moral code’87 that the Basic Law represents
for the first time in the context of climate change. This strengthens the Court’s role
as guardian of the Constitution in a scientifically and legally complex area. The fol-
lowing reflects on three legal developments where the Court expanded constitutional
doctrine and it points out where further explanations of the Court’s reasoning are de-
sirable, in the light of these newly developed constitutional standards for effective cli-
mate action.
4.1 Climate Change as Matter for the Basic Law
The Court confirmed for the first time that climate change has become a reality for
which the Basic Law offers fundamental safeguards. Emission reductions are required
until climate neutrality is achieved, and while it is important for the state to adopt
adaptation measures, no alternative to mitigation and thus, reducing GHG emissions,
exists. Especially in defining the standard for the state’s protective duty—and despite
the fact that no violation of this duty had occurred thus far—the Court elaborated a
constitutional threshold for review that resembles a ‘constitutional rulebook’ to guide
future legislative measures in the context of climate change. This is particularly signifi-
cant because it is coupled with the general acknowledgment that scientific evidence
dictates the permanent and, therefore, dynamic duty of the legislator to shape environ-
mental legislation pertaining to the latest scientific findings, and it strengthens the
Court’s own function in exercising constitutional oversight.
4.2 The ‘Advance Interference-like Effect’ and the Principle of
Proportionality
After establishing that an interference existed, the Court had to examine whether the
interference was constitutionally justified. The constitutional justification presup-
poses that the challenged provisions of the CCA are compatible with objective con-
stitutional law, including Article 20a Basic Law,88 and that they satisfy the criteria of
the principle of proportionality.89 Introducing the doctrine of ‘advance interference-
like effect’ and placing it on equal footing with the traditional understanding of the
doctrine of ‘interference’ with fundamental rights, enabled the Court to apply the
stricter constitutional yardsticks that are applicable if the subjective function of fun-
damental rights is concerned, rather than the limited scope of review that flows from
the state’s discretion to fulfil the duty to protect. Thus, only by devising the advance
interference like-effect was the Court in a position to apply the strict standard of the
proportionality test.
The new doctrine of ‘advance interference-like effect’ is evidence of creative judi-
cial reasoning that ushers in an unprecedented constitutional focus on the future
87 David Robertson, The Judge as Political Theorist. Contemporary Constitutional Review (Princeton
University Press 2010) 81, 82, see also Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts’ in Michel Rosenfeld and
András Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012) 816, 829.
88 BVerfG (n 1) paras 189, 196, 197.
89 ibid, paras 189, 192, 243.
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effect of current legislative determinations, in response to climate change. However,
it is not clear how the Court could be satisfied that a legal determination of the re-
duction pathway post-2030, or a proportionate distribution of reduction efforts,
could alleviate the consequences of a rapid consumption of the national carbon
budget where the emission amounts for even achieving a rather generous 1.75C tar-
get will be largely used by 2030, let alone for the 1.5C target. This is neither suitable
to protect the exercise of future (CO2 intensive) freedom rights from more drastic
reductions, nor does it sufficiently control or limit overall emission levels.90
Given that the calculations of the national carbon budget include considerable sci-
entific uncertainties and an exact size of the remaining budget could not be ascer-
tained, Article 20a Basic Law afforded the legislator discretion to make a value
judgment. However, this discretion cannot be exercised in accordance with political
preferences (‘nach politischem Belieben’). In contrast, as the Court stated, ’...if there
is scientific uncertainty regarding causal relationships of environmental relevance,
Art. 20a Basic Law places constraints on the legislator’s decisions—especially those
with irreversible consequences for the environment—and imposes a special duty of
care, including a responsibility for future generations’.91
The legislator must therefore consider ‘mere indications’ that point towards ‘ser-
ious or irreversible impairments’, ‘as long as they are sufficiently reliable’
(’Belastbarkeit’),92 especially when they suggest a ‘possibility of exceeding the consti-
tutionally relevant temperature limit’,93 in accordance also with Article 3(3) of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).94
In addition, in applying the principle of proportionality, it was of particular im-
portance that Article 20a Basic Law included the mandate to protect the natural
foundations of life for future generations as well. The Court found that the provi-
sions of the CCA were not justified under the proportionality principle. A propor-
tionate approach would demand ‘to ensure that the reduction of CO2 emissions to
the point of climate neutrality that is constitutionally necessary under Art. 20a GG is
spread out over time in a forward-looking manner that respects fundamental
rights’.95 This means that not one generation can use large amounts of the remaining
carbon budget while carrying a relatively small reduction burden, impliedly demand-
ing that subsequent generations carry a far greater burden of deeper reductions and
significant losses of freedoms. In other words, it excludes to ‘off-load’ the burden of
emission reductions mainly to the future.96
While the Court fully accepted the scientific evidence that ‘the amount of CO2
emissions that can be released into the Earth’s atmosphere while still complying with
90 ibid, para 244, this was recognised by the Court, para 196: ’...the legislator does remain obliged to limit
the temperature increase to preferably 1.5C – a target that it formulated when specifying Art. 20a GG.’
91 ibid, para 229.
92 ibid.
93 ibid.
94 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 UNTS 177 (entered into force 21
March 1994).
95 BVerfG (n 1) para 243; see also para 192.
96 Stephan Meyer, ‘Grundrechtsschutz in Sachen Klimawandel?’ (2020) 73 NJW 894, 896; Klaus-Ferdinand
Gärditz, art 20a GG para 24, in Landmann/Rohmer (eds), Umweltrecht (Beck, 93. EL August 2020).
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the constitutional obligation to take climate action is limited’,97 it did—rather sur-
prisingly—not question the lawfulness of the rather generous calculation of the na-
tional share of emissions. However, international and constitutional law provide a
framework for that determination as the Court had explained at length. While the
distribution of the carbon budget over time was scrutinised, neither the overall size of
the national carbon budget, let alone the inter-temporal dimension, nor the generous
median value of a temperature reference target of 1.75C, or the full dimension of
intergenerational equity, were considered in depth, and these points will be revisited
in the following section and the final part below.
4.3 Concretising Article 20a Basic Law
In Article 20a Basic Law, the aim of environmental protection is elevated to the level
of constitutional law, as an objective of the state.98 The protection of the natural
foundations of life includes the global climate.99 As such, the provision can legitimise
limitations placed upon fundamental rights and, similarly, fundamental rights can de-
fine the scope of Article 20a Basic Law.100 The nature of Article 20a Basic Law as
state objective ensures long term environmental protection, as otherwise the provi-
sion would be ‘at a structural risk of being less responsive to tackling the ecological
issues that need to be pursued over the long term’.101 This prevents an ‘ad infinitum’
development of climate change under constitutional law.102 In addition, it guarantees
the protection of future generations that cannot hold rights at present. As the
Constitutional Court explained, those will be most affected but have ‘no voice of
their own in shaping the current political agenda’.103
The Court found that the Paris Agreement as a legally binding international treaty
had a distinct bearing for Article 20a since the globally effective climate protection
efforts were mainly determined through the Paris Agreement, and the legislator had
chosen to define the climate protection obligation of Article 20a Basic Law in line
with the temperature target of the Paris Agreement.104 This fell within the preroga-
tive of the legislator and aligning climate action under the Constitution with the
Paris Agreement’s temperature target did not exceed the legislator’s discretion.105
However, it is significant that the Court proceeded to state that new scientific evi-
dence on climate change and the ability to limit and control global warming, could
require the Court to re-consider the adequacy of defining the constitutional mandate
97 BVerfG (n 1) para 246.
98 See for the role of general objectives of the state, Wolfgang Kahl, Nachhaltigkeitsverfassung.
Reformüberlegungen (Mohr Siebeck 2018) 26 and Christian Calliess, Rechtsstaat und Umweltstaat (Mohr
Siebeck 2019) 9, 10.
99 BVerfGE 118, 79, 110; Astrid Epiney, art 20a para 18 in Herrman von Mangoldt, Hans-Hugo Klein and
Christian Starck (eds), v. Mangoldt / Klein / Starck, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (Bd. 2, 7th edn, Beck
2018); Ines Härtel, ‘Klimaschutzverfassungsericht: Klima-Staatszielbestimmungen im Föderalismus’
(2020) 42 Natur und Recht 577, 578.
100 Jarass (n 6) art 20a, paras 15–17.
101 ibid, para 206 (English translation).
102 BVerfG (n 1) paras 118, 121.
103 ibid.
104 ibid.
105 BVerfG (n 1) para 211.
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through the Paris Agreement’s goals. In other words, a stricter temperature target
could be adopted in the future, if scientifically required. Consequently, the legislator
is under a continuous obligation to adapt environmental and climate law to the new-
est scientific evidence106 and these further determinations could again be subject to
constitutional review.
The temperature target was operationalised by translating it into amounts of
emission reductions, in line with the emission pathways outlined by the IPCC and
the national carbon budget calculations of the Advisory Council.107 The Advisory
Council’s calculations use ‘verifiable figures and sound calculations methods’, based
on the IPCC’s ‘scientifically justified assumptions, which were reached using a quality
assurance process’.108 The Court recognised that these calculations included consid-
erable uncertainties in both directions, the carbon budget could be larger, but it
could also be smaller. The mere fact that these uncertainties remained, could mean
that the carbon budget was possibly much smaller than assumed by the Advisory
Council.109
The German Government had argued that concrete emission reduction targets
would need to be determined at the international level, an argument that the Court
could not accept.110 Internationally agreed emission reduction targets would equally
demand to take the global carbon budget as the point of departure for these calcula-
tions. Therefore, this would only confirm the viability of the carbon budget ap-
proach. Only a climate policy that was not orientated towards achieving a concrete
temperature target could afford to use the method of ‘trial and error’.111 However, if
a concrete temperature target was pursued, the carbon budget approach offered a
suitable approach for translating the temperature target into concrete national
contributions.112
Since the state is required to implement the international legal framework to
which it has consented, in full, one may be forgiven to wonder if the Court should
not have gone further in its scrutiny of the state’s ambition, in applying the constitu-
tional standard it had developed, instead of accepting that modelling the budget cal-
culations in line with a median temperature target was lawful, albeit ‘politically not
ambitious’. The choice of a 1.75C pathway remains unfathomable in the light of
constitutional and international law, as well as the scientific evidence. With such a
reference point for the national carbon budget, the state is not implementing the
Paris Agreement’s temperature target as the CCA aspires to do, because this would
require pursuing efforts of achieving pathways corresponding to a temperature limit
of 1.5C rather than 1.75C. Not even attempting to follow the lower temperature
106 ibid, para 212.
107 BVerfG (n 1) para 215: ‘The IPCC has defined specific remaining global CO2 budgets for various tem-
perature limits and different probabilities of occurrence. On this basis, the Advisory Council has calcu-
lated a specific remaining national budget for Germany. This can be used to measure whether the
emission amounts allowed in s 3(1) second sentence and s 4(1) third sentence KSG are compatible
with the temperature limit.’ see paras 220, 231.
108 BVerfG (n 1) para 220.
109 ibid, para 228.
110 ibid, paras 69, 217.
111 ibid, para 218.
112 ibid, para 218.
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point of the range that the Paris Agreement sets forth, does not give full effect to the
Paris Agreement. It settles on a solution that risks fundamental rights and falls short
of fulfilling the mandate under Article 20a Basic Law. A constitutional obligation that
demands full implementation of the international law on climate change entails that
the state at least elaborates on constitutionally valid reasons that prevent it from fol-
lowing a reduction pathway that is consistent with a 1.5C pathway.
Furthermore, the Paris Agreement requires states to demonstrate ‘highest possible
ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances’.113 Accordingly, ambition
is a normative expectation that supports the clear wording of Article 2(1)(a) Paris
Agreement on the preferable temperature target. Ambition is to be defined and
articulated by states in the context of their own individual capacity, not compared
with that of other countries. Admittedly, the investment in own ambition presup-
poses trust, embodied in the confidence in other states’ ambition. This could lead to
a ‘wait and see’ approach, yet the Paris Agreement establishes safeguards in an at-
tempt to avoid that course of action. It stipulates that developed countries take the
lead on climate action, they must invest in own ambition before they can reasonably
expect that other states, especially developing countries, follow suit and are equally
ambitious.114 This excludes that developed countries pursue an average temperature
target approach.
Therefore, the questions to be posed to the state, and in the judicial review, are
not whether the remaining emission amounts, calculated using the arithmetic mean
of the Paris Agreement’s temperature target range, can be evenly distributed to guar-
antee the enjoyment of freedom rights after 2030, and if it is lawful to compensate
lack of ambition now with deeper emission reductions after 2030. The crucial ques-
tion is if the state is making its best efforts in emitting as little as possible and claim-
ing the smallest national carbon budget within its economic capacity, to protect its
own nationals, thereby complying with international and constitutional law. It is not
entirely clear how the Court could be content this was the case.115
5 . T H E C A R B O N B U D G E T A S F R E E D O M B U D G E T A N D
I N T E R G E N E R A T I O N A L E Q U I T Y
5.1 A Theory of Intergenerational Equity
The Court referred frequently to the protection of future generations in Article 20a
Basic Law and their rights to enjoy carbon-intensive freedoms while the state was
transitioning to a decarbonised economy. To which extent then, has the Court
113 Paris Agreement (n 14) art 4(3).
114 ibid, art 4(4).
115 After defining the framework for assessing the current emission amounts, the Court stated that s 3(1)
second sentence and s 4(1) third sentence CCA in conjunction with Annex 2 satisfy this requirement.
Taking the leeway afforded to the legislator into account, the Federal Constitutional Court cannot
presently ascertain that these provisions violate the constitutional obligation to take climate action aris-
ing from art 20a GG, the German version includes the word ‘noch’: ‘Dem werden § 3(1) zweiter Satz
und § 4(1) dritter Satz CCA in Verbindung mit Annex 2 noch gerecht’, BVerfG (n 1) para 230. The
Court continues to find: ‘a) Nonetheless, it does not seem certain that the remaining budget can be
complied with on the basis of these provisions.’, para 231.
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contributed to clarifying how future generations ought to be protected in the climate
change context? While the focus on future freedom rights enabled the Court to con-
ceptualise an advance effect of targets that amounted to an undue interference, bring-
ing one dimension of intergenerational equity to the surface, it is argued here that
this fails to make the entire spectrum of intergenerational equity as an international
principle visible, one that Article 20a Basic Law could incorporate. The following
therefore extends the Court’s reasoning into a fuller reflection on the potential that a
constitutional mandate such as Article 20a Basic Law carries for the protection of fu-
ture generations, including beyond national boundaries.
Article 20a Basic Law speaks of a responsibility of the state towards future genera-
tions through protecting the natural foundations of life and animals. The provision
aims at environmental protection at present and in the future, taking into consider-
ation potential long-term risks, a precautionary approach and the principle of sustain-
ability.116 The principle of intergenerational equity is indeed a foundation for the
concept of sustainable development.117 It is summarised in the understanding that
‘humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs’.118 Intergenerational equity links the present with the future gener-
ation in the attempt to manage and ultimately reduce the impact of each generation
on the environment. It requires to evaluate the benefit and burden sharing, and no –
within countries in an inter-temporal perspective and for the protection of all future
generations,119 it intersects with other principles of international environmental
law120 that together fill some normative gaps121 and direct the systemic interpretation
of ‘hard’ obligations in the field. The UN General Assembly adopted in 2019 a reso-
lution on the theme of ‘Protection of global climate for present and future generations
of humankind’.122 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
116 Jarass (n 6) art 20a, para 6.
117 Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Intergenerational Equity’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of
Public International Law, para 12 <https://opil.ouplaw.com/home/MPIL> accessed 22 November
2021.
118 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, 27
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf> accessed
22 November 2021.
119 Eg the Preamble of the UN Charter aspires to safe succeeding generations from the scourge of war.
120 Eg the rule of harm prevention, see Jutta Brunnée, ‘International Environmental Law and Climate
Change: Reflections on Structural Challenges in a “Kaleidoscopic” World’ (2020) 33 The Georgetown
Envtl Law Review 113, 119; see further Barbara Cosens and others, ‘Governing Complexity: Integrating
Science, Governance, and Law to Manage Accelerating Change in the Globalized Commons’ (2021)
118 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (7 September 2021) <https://www.pnas.org/
content/118/36/e2102798118> accessed 13 December 2021.
121 UN Secretary-General, Gaps in International Environmental Law and Environment-Related Instruments:
Towards a Global Pact for the Environment, UN A/73/419, 30 November 2018; for a recent evaluation
of nationally determined contributions in the light of states’ own fairness approaches, see Lavanya
Rajamani and others, ‘National “fair shares” in Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions within the
Principled Framework of International Environmental Law’ (2021) Climate Policy 1, 4, DOI: 10.1080/
14693062.2021.1970504 <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2021.1970504>
accessed 13 December 2021.
122 UN A/RES/73/232 of 20 December 2018, <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/232> accessed 13
December 2021.
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acknowledges the requirement that ‘Parties should protect the climate system for the
benefit of present and future generations of humankind’.123 The Paris Agreement
includes in its preamble a reference to the principle of ‘equity’ more generally and the
specific notion of ‘intergenerational equity’. In the operational part, it refers on three
further occasions to ‘equity’ and defines that the Agreement ‘will be implemented to
reflect equity’,124 that greenhouse gases will be stabilised ‘on the basis of equity’,125
and the central oversight mechanism of the Paris Agreement, the Global Stocktake,
refers to the implementation of the mechanism in the light of equity.126
This terminological differentiation in the Paris Agreement suggests that equity in
the context of climate change, first and foremost, applies among nations, and that
intergenerational equity is referenced in the preamble to add a long-term time hori-
zon to the Agreement, albeit without this being reflected in any of the operational
provisions. This is in contrast to the constitutional mandate, where the focus is on
equity in the inter-temporal perspective. There is no conceptual clarity on the differ-
entiation between intragenerational equity and intergenerational equity.127 The fol-
lowing demonstrates that while both principles are distinct foundational elements of
the notion of equity, the constitutional mandate to seek international cooperation,
now and in the future, shapes and informs an understanding of intergenerational
equity that encompasses intragenerational equity. In other words, the mandate to
protect the foundations of life for future generations forms part of the obligation of
the state to seek international cooperation, it is, therefore, an international principle
of intergenerational equity that Article 20a Basic Law enshrines.
Given that the legal status of the principle of equity as such and in its two varia-
tions is, to date, unclassified, the principle of intergenerational equity is equally at
risk of continuing to live in the shadow of the international climate regime, especially
in the absence of a clear legal ‘hook’ that could turn it into an operational rule. Some
courts have, however, used intergenerational equity to bolster a conservationist ap-
proach to ecosystems for future generations.128
Meanwhile, the International Court of Justice has only paid in passing attention
to intergenerational equity in the Advisory Opinion on The Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons,129 indirectly in the Gabcı́kovo-Nagymaros Case130 and left
123 UNFCCC (n 94) art 3(1).
124 Paris Agreement (n 14) art 2(2).
125 ibid, art 4(1).
126 ibid.
127 Brown Weiss (n 117).
128 Eg the Colombian Supreme Court decided that the state had not effectively protected the rights of the
future generation, STC4360-2018, 5 April 2018, Tutela of Andrea Lozana Barragán et al v The President
of the Republic of Colombia and Ministries, English translation in parts <https://www.dejusticia.org/en/
climate-change-and-future-generations-lawsuit-in-colombia-key-excerpts-from-the-supreme-courts-deci
sion/> accessed 22 November 2021; Gloucester Resources Limited v Minister for Planning [2019]
NSWLEC 7 [399]; see generally Brian J Preston, ‘The Influence of the Paris Agreement on Climate
Litigation: Legal Obligations and Norms (Part I)’ (2021) 33 JEL 1.
129 The Court recognised the long-term effects of the use of nuclear weapons and the ionising radiation, as
damaging to future generations and the environment, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1996, 226, 244 [35], 259 [86].
130 Gabcı́kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), ICJ Rep 1997, 7, 41 [53], where the International
Court of Justice referred to the ‘whole of mankind’.
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further elaboration on the principle to Separate Opinions.131 In his Separate
Opinion in Whaling in the Antarctic, Judge Trinidade concluded that ‘inter-gener-
ational equity marks presence nowadays in a wide range of instruments of inter-
national environmental law, and indeed of contemporary public international law’.132
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has incorporated the rights of the
younger generations and criticised Japan’s and Belgium’s climate policies for lacking
attention to the rights of children.133
The Federal Constitutional Court has made the principle of intergenerational
equity explicit and confirmed its status in constitutional doctrine, in line with Article
20a Basic Law,134 in the specific context of climate change. This, on its own, is al-
ready remarkable progress in the operationalisation of the principle. Similar obliga-
tions in relation to future generations exist in the constitutions of other countries,135
and this paves the way for reinforcing the principle in an inter-jurisdictional judicial
discourse.136
While beneficial for future generations, however, these constitutional provisions
tend to exclude the relationship that a generation of one country might have with
the future generations of another country. Domestic provisions extend the time hori-
zon of climate action and environmental protection measures, but they continue to
limit the benefit and burden sharing within the jurisdiction of a single country.
The following section outlines parameters of intergenerational equity that address
some of the structural limitations of environmental and climate harm avoidance in fa-
vour of protecting planetary rights, for generations yet to come as well as between
nations. On that basis, it can be demonstrated that while the Constitutional Court
has protected fundamental rights in an inter-temporal perspective, it has only indir-
ectly contributed to the protection of the natural foundations of life and thus, planet-
ary rights, for future generations, and largely treated the carbon budget as a ‘freedom
budget’. This approach, on its own, is not suitable to free the climate regime from its
inherent inequities and inequalities. Instead, in the context of a global challenge,
intergenerational equity must be devised in the light of international obligations that
131 Gabcı́kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), ICJ Rep 1997, 7 Separate Opinion of Judge
Weeramantry 88, 95; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) ICJ Rep 2010, 14, Separate
Opinion of Judge Cançado Trinidade, 135, 181 [122]–[124].
132 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand Intervening), ICJ Rep 2014, 226, Separate
Opinion of Judge Cançado Trinidade, 366 [47].
133 Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding observations on the combined fifth and sixth reports
of Belgium’ CRC/C/BEL/CO/5-6 11 (1 February 2019) <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/
3793448?ln¼en> accessed 13 December 2021; Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding
observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of Japan’ CRC/C/JPN/CO/4-5 11 (5
March 2019) <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3794942?ln¼en> accessed 13 December 2021.
134 While art 20a Basic Law refers to ‘future generations’, it does not mention the principle of intergenera-
tional equity as such, the German version of the decision refers to ‘future generations’
(künftige Generationen) and the official translation includes reference to ‘this duty to afford intergenera-
tional protection’, and explains that this has a ‘solely objective dimension’, because future generations do
not ‘yet carry any fundamental rights in the present’, BVerfG (n 1) para 146.
135 Lydia Slobodian, ‘Defending the Future: Intergenerational Equity in Climate Litigation’ (2020) 32 The
Georgetown Envtl Law Review 569, 572.
136 Petra Minnerop and Ida Røstgaard, ‘In Search of a fair Share: Article 112 Norwegian Constitution,
International Law, and an Emerging Inter-Jurisdictional Judicial Discourse in Climate Litigation’ (2021)
44 Fordham Int’l Law Journal 847, 908.
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aim at the protection of the ’global good’. Admittedly, gently developing constitu-
tional doctrine along the lines of existing concepts might be a sign of judicial wisdom
when it comes to operationalising a principle and filling normative gaps in a complex
area of law.
In a more ground-breaking fashion, Edith Brown Weiss noted already in 1987 that
it is ‘not sufficient to confine a theory of intergenerational equity to relationships be-
tween generations’.137 Her concept of intergenerational equity goes back to John
Rawls, and it advocates that one adopts the perspective of a generation that is placed
in any country at one point in time, without knowing where this would be.138
Intergenerational equity must thus be extended to include the intragenerational con-
text. Her proposed theory of intergenerational equity encompasses obligations of all
countries to future generations as a class.139 From this viewpoint, she develops three
basic principles that should inform international obligations.
These principles are the conservation of options, the conservation of quality, and
the conservation of access, each of these applicable to every generation.140 These three
principles are fulfilled through planetary obligations, they translate into five classes of
international legal duties of use that ‘can be incorporated into enforceable international
agreements or in some instances may be regarded as international law’.141
The five classes of duties of use include the following: (1) duties to take positive
steps to conserve the natural and cultural resource base, (2) duties to ensure non-
discriminatory access to the use and benefits of these resources, (3) duties to avoid
or mitigate adverse impacts on these resources or on the quality of the environment,
(4) duties to notify and to provide assistance during emergencies, and (5) duties to
bear the costs of damage to our natural and cultural resources. In developing this set
of duties for the climate change regime in its current existence, the fifth strand
encompasses duties to compensate for loss and damage as specified by the Paris
Agreement. Furthermore, to these five classes of duties, a sixth set of duties can be
added that reflects humanity’s increasing capacity to predict, prepare for, and adapt
to, adverse effects of harm to global goods such as the climate, based on scientific
evidence. This duty includes supporting those that are most vulnerable to suffer ad-
verse effects, including through rapid response measures and long-term planning.
As Brown Weiss pointed out, some of the duties are familiar, however, the novelty
lies in their development in the intergenerational context.142 This novelty exists even
more than three decades after the theory was first developed.
The rights that correspond to the legal obligations outlined above, are not pos-
sessed by individuals, and this was also noted by the Constitutional Court. In the
contrary, future generations are reliant on the international community and states as
guardians of their rights. It is inherent in the autonomy of future generations to
137 Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Intergenerational Equity in International Law’ (1987) 81 Am Society of Int’l L
Proceedings 126, 129; see also Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity and
International Law’ (2008) 9 Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 615, 622.
138 Brown Weiss, ‘Intergenerational Equity in International Law’ (n 137) 128.
139 ibid. 129, see also Brown Weiss, ‘Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity’ (n 137) 620.
140 Brown Weiss, ‘Intergenerational Equity in International Law’ (n 137) 130, 131.
141 ibid, 131.
142 ibid.
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determine their own needs and use of natural resources, consequently, the present
generation must strive to protect all ecosystems, independently from own benefits,
and without knowing what future generations will need and value. Therefore, inter-
generational equity carries some potential of moving away from a mere anthropocen-
tric perspective where protective duties are exclusively defined by present needs and
values.143 This effect is indirect, it emerges from the fact that present generations are
unable to foresee the needs of future generations. This demands to protect all natural
foundations regardless of their usefulness for present purposes.
As indicated above, courts have already played a distinct role in protecting the
rights of future generations. The concept of equity is linked to a fair distribution of
the benefits and burdens of using natural resources, and while international law on
climate change so far has failed to incorporate a systematic approach to the concept
of fairness that all Parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement can support,
some domestic landmark climate cases have developed their definition of the ‘fair
share’ of states.144 Human rights doctrine has been used with increasing success to
define states’ obligations concerning environmental protection and especially climate
action,145 and this has in turn been criticised because of the limitations that human
rights instruments might represent.146 The law remains challenged by the complex-
ities of climate change and its underlying tensions, and the realisation of equitable
outcomes of climate action, therefore, is still patchwork. In contrast, intergenera-
tional equity demands that the concern for the scope of protective measures is sys-
tematically extended into longer time horizons and that it includes broader
geographic scales as well as the conservation of planetary health in its entirety.
The following explains how the Federal Constitutional Court has indirectly pro-
tected intergenerational equity and drawn new attention to the needs of future gen-
erations, albeit limited to the territorial scope of the Basic Law. In a more subtle way,
however, it can be demonstrated that a facet of protecting intragenerational equity
can be added, because the state’s objective under Article 20a Basic Law it includes
the mandate to seek international cooperation in the protection of life’s natural
143 This addresses the juxtaposition of weak and strong sustainability, see further Dire Tladi, ‘Strong
Sustainability, Weak Sustainability, Inter-generational Equity and International Law: Using the Earth
Charter to Redirect the Environmental Ethics Debate’ (2003) 28 South African Yearbook of
International Law 200, 202.
144 The State of the Netherlands v Urgenda, Hooge Raad of the Netherldans (Supreme Court), 20 December
2020, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007, 6.3, 6.5, 7.5.1; the administrative Court of Berlin had argued that there
‘is much to be said for at least an equal global per capita distribution of the remaining global CO2
budget’, German Famers v Germany (n 17) at 25; Minnerop and Røstgaard (n 136) 847.
145 Margaret Rosso Grossman, ‘Climate Change and the Individual’ (2018) 66 Am J Compar L 345, 353;
Petra Minnerop, ‘Integrating the ‘duty of care’ under the European Convention on Human Rights and
the Science and Law of Climate Change: The Decision of The Hague Court of Appeal in the Urgenda
Case’ (2019) 37 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 149, 160; Geetanjali Ganguly, Joana Setzer
and Veerle Heyvaert, ‘If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate Change’ (2018) 38
Oxford J Legal Stud 841; Brian J Preston, ‘The Evolving Role of Environmental Rights in Climate
Change litigation’ (2018) 2 Chinese J Envt’l L 131; Jaqueline Peel and Hari M Osofsky, ‘A Rights Turn
in Climate Change Litigation?’ (2017) 37 Transnat’l Env’t LL 37; Jacqueline Peel, Hari Osofsky and
Anita Foerster, ‘Shaping the “Next Generation” of Climate Change Litigation in Australia’ (2017) 41
Melb U L Rev 793.
146 See, eg Benoit Mayer, ‘Climate Change Mitigation as an Obligation Under Human Rights Treaties?’
(2021) 115 AJIL 409.
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foundations and to build trust among states. The next section analyses the Court’s
reasoning within the framework of intergenerational equity. On that basis, it offers
an alternative approach that intersects intergenerational equity as an international
principle with existing constitutional doctrine. If understood as an international
principle, intergenerational equity encompasses the relation of one generation with
the next, regardless of territorial boundaries. The aim is to devise some conceptual
groundwork that could realistically interrupt the inheritance of planetary burdens to
the next generation in a wider geographical context. This offers a line of argument
that might be transferable to other jurisdictions.
5.2 Planetary Rights or Freedom Rights?
The Constitutional Court has not acted as guardian of planetary rights of future gen-
erations per se. It has, however, tied into constitutional doctrine the protection of
fundamental rights beyond 2030, thereby indirectly protecting planetary rights,
including for future generations. The conceptual core is the novel doctrine of the ‘ad-
vance interference-like effect’ that aims at strengthening an intertemporal and there-
fore, intergenerational, protection of rights. Setting out interim targets in the CCA
until 2030 already yields legal effects for future determinations of admissible emis-
sion amounts, deeper reductions will be necessary.147
However, the Court’s approach under fundamental rights doctrine is rooted in
the proposition that the dichotomy of the enjoyment of fundamental rights on the
one hand side, and the protection of the natural foundations of life, cannot be
resolved unless rights can be exercised without producing CO2 emissions. This per-
spective does not align with a conservationist approach that is advocated by the the-
ory of intergenerational equity, where planetary rights are protected because they,
themselves, are important for future generations, not only for the enjoyment of nature
but also because the Constitution acknowledges that the natural foundations of life
are exactly that—pre-requisites for living.
Furthermore, the focus on the advance effect of emission amounts cannot account
for the extraterritorial effect of varying degrees of ambition in mitigation action,
today and in the future, and for the undisputed fact that the state will not be in a pos-
ition to combine mitigation and adaptation measures in all situations. For those ex-
treme events where only adaptation measures would allow the state to fulfil its
protective duty, such as the easing of health impacts caused by heatwaves, the ques-
tion arises how this duty can be fulfilled in circumstances where suitable adaptation
measures are beyond reach. For example, adaptation measures might not be suffi-
cient if an unexpected extreme event unfolds, and adaptation measures are unavail-
able for the state in order to protect complainants living abroad. Especially in the
latter situation, the only option to fulfil the state’s protective duty is mitigation. It fol-
lows that mitigation efforts must increase if they constitute the only available option
for the state to discharge its protective duty.
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the assumption that future generations
must be protected in their right to use CO2 intensive freedoms means that the Court
has paid far less attention to the impacts and adverse effects of climate change for
147 BVerfG (n 1) para 186.
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the rights to health and physical integrity that are already shaping the climate reality
in Germany and globally.148 The principle of proportionality and Article 20a Basic
Law require to balance all protected rights, not just CO2 intensive freedoms and the
burden of emission reductions in the future. The carbon budget is more than just a
‘freedom budget’. The high emission amounts that the state still permits until 2030
not only diminish the amount of carbon that can be emitted in the future, they con-
tribute significantly to further climate change. In addition, scientific research has
shown that most states overestimate the contribution of their mitigation measures.149
If that is taken into consideration as additional scientific evidence pursuant to the
clearly established dynamic duty that directs environmental legislation in line with
available scientific knowledge, incorporating a safety buffer into the calculation—in
addition to pursuing 1.5C—would not only be the most effective but possibly the
only lawful course of action for the state, rather than using a tightly-knit temperature
target that falls short of a full implementation of international law and already poses
a higher risk to fundamental rights, even more so if there would be only a slight
under-performance in any of the sectors.150
There is, however, a very welcome clarification on the integration of the
Constitution with international law on climate change, and it is argued here that this
turn in the reasoning can be explored further to bring the line of argument closer to
the yardsticks of intergenerational and intragenerational equity. Article 20a Basic
Law encompasses in the words of the Court ‘the necessity to treat the natural foun-
dations of life with such care and to leave them in such condition that future genera-
tions who wish to carry on preserving these foundations are not forced engage in
radical abstinence’,151 and it is one of the Court’s key findings that this provision is
open to normative determinations flowing from international law on climate change
which the state must actively seek to develop.152 Therefore, Article 20a Basic Law
contains a duty for the state to achieve climate action beyond the domestic legal sys-
tem. Article 20a Basic Law is defined through this international law and at the same
time, the constitutional objective of the state reflects back to the level of international
148 The global average heat-related mortality per year in people older than 65 years has increased by 53.7%
from 2000–04 to 2014–18, with a global total of 296000 deaths in 2018. That amounts to a total of 20200
deaths in 2018 in Germany, according to Nick Watts and others, ‘The 2020 Report of The Lancet
Countdown on Health and Climate Change: Responding to Converging Crises’ (2021) 397 The Lancet,
129, 136; see further <https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)32290-X/
fulltext> and the report <https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/human-contribution-to-the-record-
breaking-july-2019-heat-wave-in-western-europe/> accessed 22 November 2021.
149 Joeri Rogelj and others, ‘Three Ways to Improve Net-zero Emission Targets’ (2021) 591 Nature 365,
368.
150 ibid.
151 BVerfG (n 1) para 193.
152 In confirming this approach, the Court has complied with an ‘approach that is informed by the vision of
sovereignty as a trusteeship of humanity, which requires national courts to take global interests into ac-
count when interpreting international law’, see for this ‘middle road’ option in the interpretation of
international law by national courts, Olga Frishman and Eyal Benvenisti, ‘National Courts and
Interpretative Approaches to International Law’ in Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The
Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts: Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence (OUP 2016)
317, 319.
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law and assumes a specific external dimension,153 it contains a comprehensive man-
date for fostering cooperation and an international environmental rule of law for the
benefit of human and planetary health in an inter-temporal perspective.154
Intragenerational and intergenerational equity are pursued through the set of inter-
national cooperative duties that are derived from the constitutional mandate of
Article 20a, rooted in the acknowledgement of the inherent interdependency of own
climate action with that of others, to effectuate the results of climate protection
which the Basic Law stipulates but the state, on its own, cannot guarantee. These co-
operative duties must be developed by the state in the long-term perspective, pursu-
ant to the state’s objective that Article 20a Basic Law sets forth.
Three distinct obligations that direct the state’s international climate action flow
from that provision.155 The state is, first and foremost, obliged to work towards
achieving effective climate protection in international law.156 It must, secondly, also
implement its internationally agreed obligations in domestic law.157 The state is,
thirdly, obliged to adopt climate mitigation and adaptation measures, even in the ab-
sence of successful outcomes of cooperation at the international level.158
This specific openness of the Constitution to international law, stresses the extra-
ordinary interdependence of the national and the international legal order in address-
ing global challenges. Article 20a Basic Law therefore compels the state to cooperate
internationally in order to seek the best outcomes and protect the interests of the
present and of future generations, it shapes a distinct understanding of intergenera-
tional equity as a necessarily international principle.
Re-enforcing the ‘Paris targets’ through constitutional law constitutes state prac-
tice in accordance with Article 31(3)(b) Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.159 This approach has the potential of resonating widely within the inter-
national community.160 The aim of a coherent interpretation of international treaties
amongst courts has long been favoured as ‘desirable’161 and an inter-jurisdictional ju-
dicial discourse on climate change supports this.162 International cooperation
through all branches of government, including the judiciary, is a major avenue for
operationalising and integrating intragenerational and intergenerational equity.
Finally, this renewed emphasis on the state’s constitutional duty to seek inter-
national cooperation strenghtens intergenerational equity as an international prin-
ciple also because it emphasises the role of one of the preconditions upon which the
153 This expands the scope of already existing external obligations of the state that are rooted in the consti-
tution, see for a comprehensive analysis Volker Roeben, Aussenverfassungsrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2007)
499.
154 For a discussion of the rule of law in governing complex and planetary environmental challenges, see
Jutta Brunnée, ‘The Rule of International (Environmental) Law and Complex Problems’ in Heike
Krieger, Georg Nolte and Andreas Zimmermann (eds), The International Rule of Law: Rise or Decline?
(OUP 2019) 215.
155 BVerfG (n 1) para 199.
156 ibid, paras 200, 201.
157 ibid, para 201.
158 ibid.
159 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
160 Ran Hirschl, Comparative Matters. The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2014) 75.
161 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p Shah [1999] 2 AC 629, [657] [Lord Hoffmann].
162 Minnerop and Røstgaard (n 136) 847, 908.
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Paris Agreement rests, its reliance on mutual trust.163 Building mutual trust calls
upon the state to pursue activities that foster international confidence in the prospect
that climate action can be accomplished, while safeguarding decent living conditions,
including in terms of protecting fundamental freedoms.164 This prohibits setting
incentives for other states to undermine the pursuit of treaty-based climate targets.
In the contrary, the obligation of the state to make a formative contribution towards
building trust internationally, elevated to the level of constitutional law, reinforces
the state’s obligation to set at all times an example of highest possible ambition with-
in the international community.
6 . C O N C L U S I O N
The Basic Law offers protection from adverse effects of climate change, from the per-
spective of the state’s duty to protect fundamental rights and under the state’s duty
to abstain from interferences. In addition, the state’s objective of protecting the nat-
ural foundations of life in Article 20a Basic Law, and its responsibility vis-à-vis future
generations, demand from the legislator to establish emission reduction targets be-
yond 2030 until the net-zero GHG emissions target is achieved. Furthermore, it is a
permanent obligation of the legislator to continuously develop environmental and
climate legislation in accordance with latest scientific evidence, and to take effective
action despite scientific uncertainty, especially for the protection of future genera-
tions. It remains the function of the Federal Constitutional Court to review whether
the legal framework and specifically the concretisation of Article 20a Basic Law
through the legislator respects the constitutional boundaries.
The importance assigned to the interaction between the national and the inter-
national legal order in the context of defining national climate targets and the consti-
tutionally determined duty to seek international cooperation to advance climate
protection, as well as the intertemporal perspective of rights protection that the
Constitutional Court developed through the innovative concept of the advance
interference-like effect, are significant developments of constitutional doctrine.
Particularly through the emphasis on the state’s obligations to seek international co-
operation and to build international trust, the Court has operationalised, at least in-
directly, some facets of intergenerational equity that this article has significantly
expanded upon.
However, the Court’s focus on distributing the reduction burden evenly over time
and beyond 2030 distracts from the fact that the state has claimed a rather generous
carbon budget that cannot be aligned with the Paris Agreement’s temperature target
or the agreement’s expectation of ambition. Article 20a Basic Law comprises the
state’s duty to fully implement the international law on climate change in domestic
law, as well as the mandate to protect the natural foundations of life for future gener-
ations, not (just) their CO2 producing freedom rights. Therefore, this article has ana-
lysed the Court’s understanding of intergenerational equity and it has offered a
reading of Art. 20a Basic Law that aligns the state’s objective to protect the natural
foundations of life with an international principle of intergenerational equity, one
163 BVerfG (n 1) para 202.
164 ibid, para 203.
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that transcends geographical boundaries for the protection of the climate as a global
good.
The legislator must now take steps to limit the risks to fundamental rights and ensure
that a planning horizon is established in which the necessary transformational changes
can take place. This requires a legal framework that provides for a clearly structured and
more ambitious reduction pathway. Legislation is crucial as a source of stability and pre-
dictability, and for incentivising transformational change. Intertemporal fundamental
rights protection and the international principle of intergenerational equity warrant ambi-
tious legal targets that protect the foundations of life.
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